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Environmental15 
Decision
In contrast to traditional 'risk-based' approaches to environmental decision 
making, this paper identifies the emergence of approaches based around the 
process of negotiating uncertainties. I begin by presenting different typologies 
of uncertainty before offering a synthesis conceptualisation of 'incertitude'. I 
then consider the theoretical literature on how decision making processes can 
develop to confront the challenges of different forms of incertitude and highlight 
the distinction between applying a precautionary principle and adopting a 
precautionary approach. Through doing so, this paper presents some emerging 
trends in the conceptualisation and stance adopted towards the uncertainties 
inherent in environmental decision making.
Emerging Conceptualisations of 
Uncertainty and Precaution
Fern Wickson 






































116 In modem industrial societies there is increasing scrutiny of new technologies, 
not only for their potential impacts on human health, but also for their potential 
impacts on the environment. As new technologies (such as genetic engineering) 
generate heated social debate, governments are required to regulate these 
technologies in a way that minimises negative impacts on social and biological 
environments. The question of how this regulatory decision making process 
proceeds forms the central concern of this paper. While the dominant approach to 
environmental decision making for new technologies has been one based around 
a scientific quantification of risk, in this paper I describe an emerging approach 
that bases decision making around the process of negotiating uncertainties.
Thediscourseofriskhas increasingly cometodominatedecision making processes' 
and has been particularly prominent in public policy deliberations relating to the 
environmental impact of new technological developments.2 There is however 
an emerging shift in the intellectual climate and literature on environmental 
decision making away from a focus on quantifying the environmental risk of new 
technologies to an increasing concern with how scientific uncertainties are to 
be managed and negotiated. While risk and uncertainty are inherently related 
concepts, in the past, the primary focus of environmental decision making theory 
has arguably been on how to quantify the environmental risks associated with an 
activity or technology, whereas now, there is increasing attention being paid to 
how the inherent uncertainties can be most appropriately handled.
'Risk-based' approaches to environmental decision making have generally 
employed a realist concept of risk. This concept suggests that risks exist 'out 
there' in the real world and can be objectively quantified by teams of scientific 
experts. Governments employing this concept of risk therefore tend to adopt an 
approach to decision making that privileges scientific knowledge and the advice 
of 'experts) a science/risk based approach to environmental decision making. 
The approaches to environmental decision making that are now emerging in 
the theoretical literature could be contrastingly described as precautionary and 
'uncertainty-based'.
Precautionary approaches to environmental decision making tend to adopt a 
constructivist rather than realist stance towards scientific knowledge and the 
notion of risk. A constructivist position suggests that while risks may indeed be 
'real', social values and cultural beliefs will always influence our ability to know, 
understand and calculate the risk involved with any activity or technology. In 
adopting this stance, the emerging approaches to decision making described 
in this paper as precautionary, reduce the authority of scientific knowledge and 
focus on how decision making processes negotiate the inherent uncertainties
associated with understanding the environmental impact of new technologies. 117
An important development for understanding this emerging theoretical shift 
from risk to uncertainty based processes for environmental decision making has 
been the articulation of a number of different typologies of uncertainty.
Typologies of Uncertainty
One particularly influential contribution to the conceptualisation of different 
types of uncertainty in environmental decision making has been presented by 
Brian Wynne.3 According to Wynne's typology, 'risk' can only be talked about 
authentically where the behaviour of a system is believed to be well characterised. 
In this way, the probabilities associated with different outcomes can be thought 
to be reasonably calculated -  i.e. we can talk about'risk 'when we have some basis 
to claim that w e 'know  the odds'. The second category in Wynne's typology is that 
of 'uncertainty', which is used to describe situations where important system 
parameters are known but the probability distributions are not -  i.e. uncertainty 
occurs when we 'don't know the odds'involved. 'Uncertainty', for Wynne relates to 
a lack of knowledge and is therefore something that can conceptually be reduced 
through further research.
Wynne's third type of uncertainty is labelled 'ignorance' and refers to those 
situations where 'we don't know what we don't know'. Ignorance in this sense 
refers more to ignorance in relation to the relevant questions rather than ignorance 
about the answers. For example, in testing the environmental impact of chemicals 
30 years ago, we were'ignorant'about the potential risks of endocrine disruption. 
Rather than simply not having enough information to make a judgement and 
being uncertain, we were ignorant that this was in fact a potential risk and we 
didn't know that we didn't know about it.
Wynne suggests that ignorance is endemic to scientific knowledge as science 
necessarily reduces complex systems and the multitude of potential problem 
formulations to those which are applicable to particular disciplinary models and 
methods. Value judgements in terms of the relevant endpoints and pragmatic 
considerations in terms of what is possible within a particular paradigm of 
thought, timeframe or financial position all structure what develops as scientific 
knowledge and this excludes other potential ways of framing a problem or 
research approach. For Wynne, this inherent ignorance in the way scientific 
knowledge develops really only becomes problematic when science is applied to 
policy making without a clear recognition of the limitations of that knowledge.




































118 is said to arise because of the open-ended nature of causal chains and the way 
in which outcomes are dependent on the behaviour of various agents engaged 
in interconnecting systems. Indeterminacy is a type of uncertainty that relates 
to the way in which behaviour can vary across different contexts and through 
time and how different actions taken by humans will affect processes causing 
environmental impacts. Recognition of the element of indeterminacy highlights 
the importance of considering potential social interactions when aiming to assess 
the environmental impacts of new technologies. An example of indeterminacy 
might be our inability to determinethe behaviour of farmers and rural communities 
when trying to assess the environmental risks of genetically modified (GM) crops. 
What other crops, plants, animals, chemicals etc GM plants may be exposed to 
over their lifetimes and how this will vary in different locations and times can be 
seen to represent an element of indeterminacy for decision makers.
Wynne argues that the traditional process of risk analysis was originally 
developed in application to technological artefacts, where system behaviour 
could be well characterised and the probabilities associated with particular 
outcomes reasonably calculated. When being applied to environmental systems, 
however, this process of risk analysis fails to take account of the new types of 
uncertainty (specifically ignorance and indeterminacy) that become important. 
When policy deliberations use a traditional language of risk to consider the 
potential environmental impacts posed by technological developments, the 
full range of different forms of uncertainty involved is generally reduced so that 
only uncertainty as incomplete knowledge is considered in the analysis. Wynne 
suggests that the failure of traditional approaches to acknowledge the existence 
and importance of ignorance and indeterminacy in environmental risk assessment 
fails to consider the way in which ignorance and indeterminacy can be sources of 
risk in themselves.4
This conceptualisation of the different types of uncertainty affecting 
environmental risk assessment processes leads Wynne to suggest that to 
understand environmental harm we need'not only intense and open examination 
of the scientific evidence and competing interpretations in an area of interest'but 
also 'reflexive learning...about the nature and inherent limitations in principle 
of that knowledge'.5 To make our ignorance 'useable',6 Wynne suggests that the 
issues of ignorance and indeterminacy need to be embraced in broader social 
debate about the commitment to particular technological trajectories.To achieve 
this, regulatory cultures need to recognise the importance of these forms of 
uncertainty and develop in a way that actively encourages public debate on not 
only the costs and benefits involved with particular technological developments, 
but also on the indeterminacies involved. This means that scientific research
used in policy settings should be opened to debate (or deconstructed) and 119 
'renegotiated'through engagement with various stakeholders and the different 
values and epistemological commitments they bring to the process.7
This notion of negotiation and critical reflection on the scientific knowledge 
applied to modern issues of risk and the environment has also been espoused 
by Carr & Levidow through their description of the process of 'Negotiated 
Science'.8 Carr & Levidow attach importance to the way in which environmental 
questions can be differentially framed and the way natural and social systems 
intertwine in issues of environmental risk. Emphasis is placed on the importance 
of'unknowns' in the anticipation of environmental impacts and the suggestion is 
that these unknowns (or different forms of uncertainty) require a new approach 
to risk assessment. The suggestion that follows is once again that the challenges 
associated with different types of uncertainty require a democratisation of the risk 
assessment process through the encouragement of active public engagement 
with the process and a broad based scrutiny of scientific evidence and expertise.
The idea is that to adequately address the different types of uncertainty involved 
in environmental risk decisions, scientific knowledge needs to be 'negotiated' 
through deliberations including relevant stakeholders and the public.9
I n addition to Wynne's typology, Stirling10 and Stirling & Gee11 have also developed 
a characterisation of different forms of uncertainty relevant to environmental 
decision making for new technological developments. As uncertainty is a term 
that is given a specific meaning in the typology, however, Stirling and Stirling &
Gee use 'incertitude' rather than 'uncertainty' as the collective term for describing 
what their typology characterises. The criteria used to classify different forms of 
incertitude in this typology are knowledge about likelihoods and knowledge 
about outcomes. According to this typology (and echoing Wynne's description),
'Risk'refers to situations where there is some basis for assigning probabilities and 
outcomes are well defined.'Uncertainty'is the title given to the type of incertitude 
where outcomes are well defined but there is no concrete basis for assigning 
probabilities to those outcomes.12 Again, this understanding of what constitutes 
'uncertainty'is analogous to that presented by Wynne.
Where the characterisation of outcomes is poorly defined but there is some basis 
for assigning probabilities, this type of incertitude is referred to by Stirling and 
Stirling & Gee as 'Ambiguity'. Elaborating on the factors that lead to this category 
of incertitude, Stirling & Gee state that 'The multidimensionality, complexity 
and scope of the different forms of environmental risk and the different ways 
of framing and prioritising these risks can easily render the characterisation of 



































120 Levidow's emphasis on the important impact divergent framing assumptions can 
play and is analogous to Klinke & Renn's description of ambiguity as the'variability 
of (legitimate) interpretations'stemming from'differences in interpreting factual 
statements about the world or from differences in applying normative rules to 
evaluate a state of the world)14 Stirling & Gee give the example of defining the 
notion of'environmental harm 'for the environmental release of GM  crops as an 
issue where ambiguity is a particularly important element of the incertitude faced 
by regulatory decision makers.15
The final type of incertitude in the typology developed by Stirling and Stirling & 
Gee is entitled 'Ignorance'. Ignorance is said to represent the type of incertitude 
that is present when outcomes are poorly defined and there is no basis for 
assigning probabilities. In the sense that this idea of'ignorance ' relates to the 
things we don't know we don't know, it can be seen to mirror the characterisation 
provided by Wynne. Stirling however states that ignorance 'arises from many 
familiar sources, including incomplete knowledge, contradictory information, 
conceptual imprecision, divergent frames of reference and the intrinsic complexity 
or indeterminacy of many natural and social processes'.16This description of what 
gives rise to a state of ignorance seems to conflate elements of what Wynne 
separates as uncertainty (incomplete knowledge), indeterminacy (particularly 
in relation to the interactions between natural and social processes) and 
ignorance. This description of what gives rise to a state of ignorance also seems 
to encompass what Klinke & Renn would perhaps separate as ambiguity (arising 
from contradictory information and divergent frames of reference).
While these typologies differ in how they draw boundaries of distinction and define 
what constitutes the different forms of incertitude relevant to environmental 
decision making, I believe some patterns can be extracted and developed into 
conceptually useful categories. Firstly, there appears to be agreement that the 
term risk is specifically relevant to situations where both potential outcomes 
and the probabilities associated with those outcomes can be reasonably well 
characterised. Uncertainty is a term that can be best applied to those situations 
where there is some agreement about the potential outcomes but the basis for 
assigning the relevant probabilities is not strong. I would suggest that this state 
of'uncertainty'stem s primarily from a perceived lack of relevant information or 
incomplete knowledge. In this sense, uncertainty is a form of incertitude that 
can conceptually be reduced by further research; it is a situation where there is 
agreement on the potential outcomes but the research on which an assignment 
of probabilities can occur needs further development. These understandings 
of risk and uncertainty are those that have traditionally been employed in risk 
analyses.
121
When attempting to assess the environmental impacts of new technologies and 
their acceptability, new types of incertitude arise that are not well addressed by 
traditional approaches to risk analysis and the notion of uncertainty as it has 
been understood in these approaches. These types of incertitude can be titled 
ambiguity, indeterminacy and ignorance. I would suggest that ambiguity can be 
seen as a result of contradictory information and/or the existence of divergent 
framing assumptions and values. I would describe indeterminacy as the type 
of incertitude that exists because of the intrinsic complexity associated with 
predicting the outcomes (and probabilities) associated with the interaction of 
various open-ended social and natural systems, while ignorance can perhaps best 
be used to describe our inability to conceptualise, articulate and therefore consider 
the outcomes and causal relationships that lie beyond current frameworks of 
understanding - the things we don't know we don't know.
Through providing a way to conceptualise the different forms of uncertainty 
that arise in attempts to assess the environmental impacts associated with new 
technologies, these typologies of incertitude highlight some of the limitations 
associated with traditional risk assessment processes. More specifically, these 
typologies enable us to see the way in which traditional risk assessment 
processes generally fail to take account of incertitude in the forms of ambiguity, 
indeterminacy, ignorance and even uncertainty in some cases.17 Recognising this 
inadequacy of traditional risk assessment processes, particularly when they are 
applied to the environmental impacts of new technologies, is said to represent 
'the real justification and imperative for adopting newly emerging precautionary 
approaches'.18
Precaution: The Precautionary Principle
While applying precaution in environmental decision making may seem like 
common sense, the articulation of a formal 'precautionary principle' for policy 
making was a modification of the German'Vorsorgeprinzip'19 and was originally 
developed asa means tojustify regulatory restrictions placed on marine discharges 
into the North Sea despite the existence of a lack of scientific consensus about 
the causal relationships between these discharges and environmental harm.20 
The principle has now been widely adopted in both national and international 
environmental legislation and is particularly prevalent in debates over the 
regulation of the environmental impacts of new technologies.21
An early definition of the precautionary principle that is commonly cited was 
given in the 1990 Bergen Declaration of European Ministers where it was stated 






































122 certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation".22 When the principle was formulated in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration that emerged from the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED), the term 'measures'was changed to 
'cost-effective measures'AThe term'cost-effective'was added as an'oral correction' 
by the delegate to this conference from the US and received formal objections at 
the time from both delegates of the European Union and Japan.24
While specific definitions of the precautionary principle differ between countries 
and pieces of environmental legislation,25 common elements of what constitutes 
the principle can be identified. Firstly, the precautionary principle demonstrates 
a preventive or anticipatory approach to controlling environmental harm, rather 
than a defensive or reactionary approach that seeks to remedy environmental 
harm only after it has occurred.26 This can be viewed as a shift of environmental 
decision making 'upstream'27 where policy is aimed at identifying and avoiding 
potential sources of environmental harm before they occur ratherthan remedying 
the damage once it has already taken place. Additionally, a precautionary 
approach to environmental decision making sees a shift in the burden of proof 
relating to environmental harm.28 Ratherthan the onus of proof resting with those 
claiming an action is environmentally harmful, it becomes the responsibility of 
those promoting a potentially damaging activity or technology to show that the 
degree of environmental change associated with that activity or technology is 
within tolerable bounds.
For the purposes of this paper, it is the relationship between precaution and 
scientific uncertainty that is most pertinent. The precautionary principle 
represents a clear recognition of the existence of scientific uncertainty in relation 
to environmental assessments and suggests that it is important for decision 
makers to actively consider the limitations of scientific knowledge when making 
decisions about activities and technologies that are potentially harmful to 
the environment. When the precautionary principle is adopted as a guide for 
environmental policies, it becomes important to not only consider the weight of 
scientific knowledge when making a decision but also the limitations associated 
with that knowledge, the degrees of uncertainty involved and the implications 
of this uncertainty for maintaining a preventative approach to environmental 
harm.
Criticisms of the Precautionary Principle
While the precautionary principle can be seen to represent a shift in the basis 
for environmental decision making, the extent to which it enables engagement 
with the full range of types of incertitude described above is debateable. It has
been suggested that some of the existing interpretations of the precautionary 123 
principle, although acknowledging the importance of uncertainty for 
environmental decision making, do not necessarily dictate an engagement with 
the types of incertitude described in this chapter as ambiguity, ignorance and 
indeterminacy.29 This is because the understanding of 'scientific uncertainties' 
that is often adopted in application of the principle is one in which the only type 
of incertitude involved is one conceptually reducible through further research.
This means that while the principle has developed to provide guidance for what 
should happen under situations of scientific'uncertainty', it does not necessarily 
enable or encourage an engagement with the important issues and challenges of 
ignorance, indeterminacy and ambiguity.
An additional criticism is that while the precautionary principle certainly offers 
policy makers greater scope to acknowledge, clarify and engage with scientific 
uncertainty, this can also be problematic because full scientific certainty is rarely, 
if ever, claimed in relation to judgements of safety and therefore the degree of 
uncertainty involved with any decision can be viewed as ambiguous.30 Additionally, 
the usefulness of the 'cost-effective' criterion in relation to environmental 
protection measures has been questioned because it necessarily implies that 
there is adequate knowledge to predict the degree of potential damage and 
therefore enable an assessment of what a 'cost-effective' measure for avoidance 
might be.31 Similar criticisms of the formulaic version of the principle suggest 
that the idea of what counts as a threat, the criteria for judging seriousness or 
irreversibility, how the degree of uncertainty is to be judged and the yardstick 
forjudging what is cost effective are all issues for which no objective or single 
rational answer exists.32 This means that applying the notion of precaution as a 
dogmatic principle or rule becomes problematic at least and paralysing at worst.
Finally, while the precautionary principle may represent a desire to shift 
the burden of proof, the issue of how far along the axis of'guilty until proven 
innocent'decision makers need to slide is also problematic. Does adoption of the 
precautionary principle as a policy guide mean that decision makers are required 
to avoid an activity at the slightest hint of danger? What does it take to 'prove' 
innocence? What will constitute acceptable evidence? How will the inevitable 
tradeoffs between safety and costs be decided when weighing the available 
information against potential avoidance measures? These questions suggest that 
while the precautionary principle may be seen to represent admirable sentiments 
for environmental protection, important questions remain about how it can be 
practically applied in political decision making.




































124 are just the tip of the iceberg in relation to the debates over the principle's 
practical usefulness and how it can be translated into concrete decision making 
processes.33 The combined weight of the criticisms directed at the precautionary 
principle is however seeing an emerging theoretical shift away from discussions 
of how a specific 'precautionary principle' can be applied, towards a description 
of what a'precautionary approach'to decision making might entail. In this sense, 
the notion of precaution is moving away from being a formulaic decision making 
rule, towards what might be described as a particular process based approach to 
decision making.
Precautionary Approaches to Environmental 
Decision Making
Based on an explicit recognition of the importance of scientific uncertainty for 
environmental decision making, the precautionary principle has been influential 
in enabling an acknowledgement of the limitations of scientific knowledge for 
assessing the future environmental impacts of certain activities or technologies. 
In a precautionary approach to environmental decision making this translates 
into the requirement for a greater degree of humility about scientific knowledge 
in the face of various types of incertitude.34
Associated with this need for a greater degree of humility about scientific 
knowledge is the requirement for a more reflective approach to science that 
enables the knowledge to be examined, reflected upon and considered in terms 
of the uncertainties, underlying assumptions and subjectivejudgements involved. 
This reflective approach to scientific knowledge can be undertaken by not only 
exposing particular knowledge claims to the scrutiny of various other scientific 
disciplines but also to stakeholders and the public more broadly- i.e. to a process 
of 'extended peer review'.35 The suggestion that precautionary approaches to 
decision making require humility and reflection on scientific knowledge therefore 
leads to calls for broad based participation in decision making processes. Broad 
based participation in decision deliberations is certainly justified when decisions 
involve value judgements and widespread uncertainties, but it is also said to be 
important for encouraging an engagement with the ambiguities and subjective 
elements involved in the framing of risk science.36
In addition to a reflective approach to scientific knowledge and theencouragement 
of broad based participation in decision making processes, precautionary 
approaches are also said to require detailed consideration of the benefits and 
potential adverse effects associated with a range of alternative options.37 This 
means that a range of policy options for delivering a particular good or service 
need to be considered when a particular activity or technology is judged in a
regulatory arena.38 This requirement to consider various alternatives has also 125
led to the suggestion that decisions need not necessarily focus on what is the 
'best option' but perhaps also on how to maintain diversity, resilience, flexibility 
and adaptability across a range of policy options.39 This is said to represent not 
only a way to handle ambiguity (diversification offering a way to accommodate 
different values and interests) but also as a way to approach the challenges 
associated with ignorance (when there are things we don't know we don't know, 
the best approach might be one focussed on flexibility and adaptability, or in 
other words, 'not putting all our eggs in one basket').40While the idea of making 
political decisions to encourage flexibility and minimise error costs may not be 
a new idea in itself, it does represent an important point of difference between 
what the precautionary principle says is important for decision making and what 
is seen to constitute a precautionary approach.
Another important element in what constitutes a precautionary approach to 
environmental decision making is stated as being the requirement for ongoing 
research and dedicated monitoring efforts.41 Through a commitment to ongoing 
research and environmental monitoring the idea is that uncertainty can continue 
to be reduced and our degree of exposure to surprises that may arise due to our 
ignorance can be minimised.42
In summary then, the elements of what represents a precautionary approach to 
environmental decision making are:
1. A recognition of the limitations of scientific knowledge and a 
willingness to expose scientific claims to a reflective process of'extended 
peer review'.
2. A commitment to reducing uncertainties and minimising surprises 
generated by ignorance through ongoing research and monitoring.
3. A transparent handling of ambiguity and indeterminacy through 
reflection on scientific knowledge claims, broad based public participation 
and the consideration and implementation of a range of policy options.
In general, a precautionary approach can be seen to represent a more inclusive, 
democratic and reflective process for decision making than conventional 
approaches to risk assessment where decision making is viewed as primarily 





































126 Science-Based and Precaution-Based Approaches to 
Environmental Decision Making
Critics of using the notion of precaution in environmental decision making often 
emphasise the concept's vagueness and ambiguity, although this is criticism is 
usually directed at the specific precautionary principle rather than the process 
based precautionary approach to decision making that has been outlined above. 
These critics of approaches to decision making that are based around the notion 
of precaution often hold up science/risk-based assessment approaches as being 
the preferred alternative. The claim that regulation should be'science/risk-based' 
as opposed to 'precaution/uncertainty-based'appeals to the traditional image of 
science as providing certain and objective knowledge, revealing the real world as 
it exists outside of social and cultural frameworks. The presentation of precaution 
and science based approaches as representing mutually exclusive decision 
making strategies serves to suggest that precaution based approaches result in 
decisions that are not based on a rigorous assessment of the'facts'.
As described in the introduction, a constructivist understanding of scientific 
knowledge suggests that the 'facts' are always influenced by social factors and 
subjective framing assumptions. As a precaution based approach accepts this and 
attempts to provide a process for dealing with the various types of incertitude 
involved in environmental decision making, this approach will usually be favoured 
by those adopting constructivist positions on the nature of scientific knowledge. It 
has, however, been argued that science-based and precaution-based approaches 
to environmental decision making do not have to be conceptually separated 
and that in fact, the type of precautionary approach outlined above holds a 
more authentic claim to what it means to be'science-based'than the traditional 
narrowly framed approaches to risk analysis.43
The argument in this case is that denying the existence or relevance of the 
challenges associated with ambiguity, indeterminacy and ignorance for decisions 
involving the prediction of impacts in complex, interacting and open-ended 
systems does not really represent a rational approach to decision making:
"a precautionary approach's greater breadth of scope and attention to 
a greater diversity of information and knowledge could be considered 
more scientifically robust than the relatively narrow and uncertainty- 
suppressing tendencies of so-called science-based approaches like cost- 
benefit analysis and risk assessment".44
The process of using risk analysis to make decisions has traditionally been
based on a belief in the certainty and objectivity of scientific knowledge. The 127 
challenges associated with applying this approach to decision making regarding 
the environmental impact of new technologies have largely been made visible 
through the conceptualisation of new and different types of incertitude that are 
involved in these types of decisions. These challenges are said to require a new 
approach to decision making that is better able to acknowledge and handle the 
full range of types of incertitude; an approach that recognises the limitations of 
scientific knowledge, engages the public and a range of different stakeholders in 
decision deliberations, assesses a range of different policy options and focuses on 
the fostering of diversity, resilience, flexibility and adaptability -an approach that 
has been characterised as precautionary rather than science based.
By distinguishing between'science'and'precaution'based approaches to decision 
making, I do not mean to imply that approaches using scientific information cannot 
involve the adoption of a position of caution or that precautionary approaches 
do not involve the use of scientific knowledge or experts. What I am essentially 
distinguishing between is the role and degree of influence awarded to scientific 
knowledge and expertise. In science or risk based approaches to decision making, 
science has traditionally held a monopoly on authority, whereas in precaution- 
based approaches, science is recognised as having limitations and this enables 
a plurality of rationalities and value sets and a broader range of concerns to be 
recognised and embraced in the decision making process.
Calling these different approaches to decision making 'science' and 'precaution' 
based may be misleading and therefore we might better conceptualise the 
key differences existing between these approaches as differences between 
a technocratic approach, based primarily on scientific risk analysis, and a 
more democratic approach focussed around the deliberative negotiation of 
uncertainties. Which of these types of decision making is favoured in any given 
situation will depend to a substantial degree on the nature of the problem at 
hand, the extent to which a regulatory body adheres to a realist ora constructivist 
position on scientific knowledge and issues of risk and/or the degree to which 
technocratic politics and ideology (the belief that environmental decisions 
are technical and can be answered by scientific experts alone) have become 
entrenched in society.
Conclusion
The conceptualisation and articulation of different types of incertitude arising 
in decision making processes dealing with the environmental implications of 
new technologies has revealed the limitations of traditional processes of risk 





































128 (such as genetic engineering) important forms of incertitude (ambiguity, 
indeterminacy and ignorance) are not well acknowledged or handled by risk- 
based approaches to environmental decision making. There is an emerging 
theoretical trend towards decision making approaches that foreground the 
issue of negotiating incertitude. In distinction to a calling for the application of a 
precautionary principle, these approaches represent a process based response to 
what it means for decision making to be precautionary.
The emerging process based precautionary approaches, which focus on how 
incertitude is handled, reimagine the role for science in environmental policy 
and advocate more reflective, participatory and deliberative approaches to 
decision making. The challenges associated with adopting and evaluating these 
approaches should not be underestimated; however, that is a topic I will explore 
in another paper.
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